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A Comparative Look at the Reporter's Privilege
in Criminal Cases: United States, Federal
Republic of Germany, and Switzerland
The reporter's privilege allows journalists to withhold the
identity of news sources during investigatory proceedings.' This
controversial privilege has received considerable attention from
legislative bodies, courts and scholars in the United States, the
Federal Republic of germ an^,^ and Switzerland. Unique national ideas of the press and its role have caused each of these
countries to reach different conclusions about granting a reporter's privilege.
The major developments involving the reporter's privilege
in the United States, West Germany, and Switzerland occurred
approximately ten years ago. However, questions about the existence and scope of the privilege have continued to trouble the
lower courts and scholars of each country. This comment compares the availability of the reporter's privilege in criminal actions in the three countries and examines the structural and ideological developments leading to the enactment of their present
laws.3

A reporter in the United States has little protection against
judicially compelled disclosure of the identity of his sources in a
criminal prosecution because there is no federal statutory or ju1. The terms reporter's privilege and Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht (the German term)
are used in civil, administrative, and criminal proceedings. However, this comment discusses only the criminal procedure aspect. The reporter's privilege is not limited to reporters. The term is used here to refer to all those working in the news media who are
accorded privileges by statutes and judicial decisions. (Translations of all German materials are the author's.)
2. The Federal Republic of Germany will hereinafter be referred to as West
Germany.
3. Much of the discussion about the present state of the law will center around
landmark judicial decisions. The use of judicial decisions to explain the approaches of
the various countries is not intended to emphasize the importance of the judiciary in
formulating the reporter's privilege. The role of the judiciary has varied in the different
countries, but the court opinions can serve as official statements about the reporter's
privilege in the various legal systems.
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dicially recognized reporter's pri~ilege.~
Congress has considered
reporter's privilege' legislation several times, but has never
adopted a federal reporter's privilege ~ t a t u t e The
. ~ judiciary has
been hindered in developing a common law reporter's privilege
by Branzburg u. ha ye^,^ a 1972 Supreme Court decision holding
that there is no constitutional basis for a reporter's privilege.
Branzburg u. Hayes is the only Supreme Court decision that
In Branzburg, the Court condiscusses the reporter's pri~ilege.~
sidered the appeals of three journalists who had been subpoenaed by grand juries to answer questions concerning the journalists' reports on certain criminal activities. On three occasions the
journalists refused to appear before the grand juries. On two
other occasions the journalists appeared, but refused to answer
questions relating to the identity of their sources after claiming
a reporter's privilege under the first amendment.s The Court rejected the journalists' argument and held that requiring journalists to appear and testify before state or federal grand juries
does not abridge the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by
the first amendment.9
4. See generally Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH.L
REV. 229 (1971); D'Alemberte, Journalists Under the Axe: Protection of Confidential
Sources of Information, 6 HARV.J . ON LEGIS.307 (1969); Eckhardt & McKey, Reporter's
Privilege: An Update, 12 CONN.L. REV.435 (1980); Edelstein & LoBue, Journalist's
L. REV.913 (1979); Guest & StanPriuilege and the Criminal Defendant, 47 FORDHAM
zler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw.U.L.
REV. 18 (1969); Murasky, The Journalist's Privilege: Branzburg and Its Aftermath, 52
TEX.L. REV.829 (1974); Nelson, The Newsmen's Privilege Against Disclosure of Confidential Sources and Information, 24 VAND.L. REV.667 (1971); Note, Reporter's and
Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 YALEL.J.
317 (1970).
5. See, e g . , Newsmen's Privilege: Hearings on S. 36, S. 158, S. 318, S. 451, S. 637, S.
750, S. 870, S. 917, S. 1128 and S.J. Res. 8 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Newsmen's
Privilege; Hearing on H.R. 717 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). See also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 689
n.28 (1972).
6. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
7. The only other time the entire Court has considered similar issues was in Zurcher
v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), which involved the search and seizure of newsroom materials.~Individualjustices have, on occasion, stated opinions on reporter's privilege. See, e g . , In re Roche, 448 U.S. 1312 (1980) (Brennan, J., opinion in chambers).
8. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667-78. This was not the first time a first amendment
claim had been made. However, such claims have generally been unsuccessful. See, e.g.,
Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958); In re Goodfader, 45 Hawaii 317,367 P.2d 472 (1961); State v. Buchanan, 250 Or. 244,436 P.2d 729,
cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968); In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).
9. Branzburg, 408 U.S. a t 667.
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Justice White's plurality opinion noted that "[tlhe heart of
the claim is that the burden on news gathering resulting from
compelling reporters to disclose confidential information outweighs any public interest in obtaining the information."1•‹ The
Court weighed the importance of "the right to every man's evidence,"" especially in criminal grand jury proceedings, against
the possible harm to a journalist's ability to gather news, and
found the evidentiary interest more compelling.'* Although
newsgathering does qualify for first amendment protection, the
Court held that journalists are afforded no greater protection
than the average citizen.13 The Court particularly emphasized
that "[flrom the beginning of our country the press has operated
without constitutional protection for press informants, and the
press has flourished. The existing constitutional rules have not
been a serious obstacle to either the development or retention of
confidential news sources by the press."14
The Court did not grant journalists a conditional first
amendment privilege because of the difficulty in (1) defining the
terms and scope of the privilege, (2) distinguishing between different crimes, and (3) providing journalists with a reliable rule.15
According to the Court, the Constitution offers protection only
when grand jury investigations are undertaken in bad faith to
harass and "disrupt a reporter's relationship with his news
s~urces."~~
Justice Powell's pivotal concurring opinion articulated a less
rigorous standard that has been applied by many courts to limit
the impact of Branzburg. Justice Powell stated the rule:
The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by
the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press
and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony
with respect to criminal conduct. The balance of these vital
constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case basis ac10. Id. at 681.
11. Id. at 688 (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE
5 2192 (rev. ed. 1961)).
12. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690. In considering the possible negative effects of compelled disclosure of the source's identity, the Court looked at articles by Blasi and Guest
& Stanzler that contained surveys and empirical studies of the use of confidential information by journalists. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 694 nn.32 & 33. Some commentators feel
the Court misread the data in favor of its finding. See, e.g., Murasky, supra note 4.
13. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681-85.
14. Id. at 698-99.
15. Id. at 702-04.
16. Id. at 707-08.
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cords with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such
questions."
Courts have used the Powell approach to limit Branzburg to its
facts. However, no common law reporter's privilege has been
granted in criminal proceedings unless the investigation was undertaken in bad faith to harass the reporter or state statutory
provisions specifically granted the privilege.ls
Although the Branzburg decision has been uniformly criticized, neither the Court nor Congress has been persuaded to
grant a reporter's privilege in criminal cases.lS However, the
Court in Branzburg did recognize that state statutes may provide for a reporter's privilege.20At the time Branzburg was decided nineteen states accorded some form of statutory reporter's
p r i ~ i l e g e Today
. ~ ~ twenty-five states have reporter privilege statutes that grant varying degrees of privilege.22However, despite
17. Id. at 710 (emphasis added).
RIGHTSAND LIABILITIES
OF PUBLISHERS,
BROADCASTERS
AND RE18. See S. METCALF,
PORTERS •˜ 3.09 (1982).
19. The principles of the Branzburg decision appear to have been reinforced by
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). Nonetheless, Justice Brennan stated in
In re Roche, 448 U.S. 1312, 1315 (1980) (Brennan, J., opinion in chambers), that he did
"not believe that the Court has foreclosed news reporters from resisting a subpoena on
First Amendment grounds."
20. 408 US. at 688-89.
21. See Comment, The Fallacy of Farber: Failure to Acknowledge the Constitu299,304-08
tional Newsman's Privilege in Criminal Cases, 70 J. CRIM.L. & CRIMINOLOGY
(1979).
22. ALA. CODE•˜ 12-21-142 (1977) (absolute privilege as to identity of source);
ALASKA
STAT.•˜•˜ 09.25.150-.220 (1983) (qualified privilege); ARIZ.REV.STAT.ANN. 122237 (1982) (absolute privilege as to identity of source); ARK.STAT.ANN.3 43-917 (1977)
(must be an initial showing of publication with malice to require disclosure); CAL.EVID.
CODE3 1070(a) (West Supp. 1984) (only protects newsmen from contempt); DEL. CODE
ANN.tit. 10, •˜•˜ 4320-4326 (1974) (qualified privilege); IND.CODEANN. 34-3-5-1 (Burns
Supp. 1983) (limited to identity of source); KY.REV.STAT.ANN3 421.100 (Bobbs-Merrill
1970) (directed only to identity of source of published information); LA.REV.STAT.ANN.
45:1451-1454 (West 1982) (qualified privilege); MD. CTS.& JUD.PROC.CODEANN. 9112 (1984) (absolute privilege as to the identity of sources); MICH.COMP.LAWSANN.•˜
767.5a (West 1982) (absolute privilege); MINN.STAT.ANN $3 595.021-.025 (West Supp.
1984) (qualified privilege); MONT.CODEANN.$3 26-1-901 to -903 (1983) (absolute privilege); NEB. REV.STAT.•˜•˜ 20-144 to -147 (1977) (absolute privilege); NEV.REV.STAT.$
49.275 (1981) (absolute privilege); N.J. STAT.ANN.•˜ 2A:84A-21, -21a, -21.1 to -21.9 (West
Supp. 1983-84) (qualified privilege); N.M. STAT.ANN.•˜ 38-6-7 (Supp. 1983) (privilege
does not apply to judicial proceedings: Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 89
N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976)); N.Y. CIV.RIGHTSLAW•˜ 79-h (McKinney Supp. 198384) (absolute privilege); N.D. CENT.CODE$ 31-01-06.2 (1976) (qualified privilege); OHIO
REV.CODEANN. 2739.04, .12 (Page 1981 & Supp. 1984) (protects only identity of
source: State v. Geis, 2 Ohio App. 3d 258, 441 N.E.2d 803 (1981)); OKLA.STAT.ANN.tit.
12, 2506 (West 1980) (limited privilege); OR. REV.STAT.$8 44.510-.540 (1981) (limited

4311

REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE

435

the existence of numerous state reporter's privilege statutes, the
judiciary has continued to restrict the privilege in criminal
Thus, a reporter in the United States has little protection
against being compelled to disclose the identity of sources. The
Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg, which held that there is
no constitutional basis for a reporter's privilege, has limited judicial development of the reporter's privilege to a case by case
balancing of law enforcement interests against
the function of
the press. Law enforcement interests have predominated. Therefore, Congress's failure to enact a federal reporter's privilege
statute has left reporters dependent on state laws that often do
not provide adequate protection in criminal cases.

The reporter's privilege has also been the subject of considerable discussion in West Germany26 because of legislation
privilege); 42 PA. CONS.STAT.ANN.3 5942 (Purdon 1982) (broad protection); R.I. GEN.
LAWS$8 9-19.1-1 to -3 (Supp. 1983) (qualified privilege); TENN.CODEANN.5 24-1-208
(1980) (qualified privilege). A characterization of the statutes is found in S. METCALF,
supra note 18, a t 3 3.02.
23. See, eg., H. NELSON& D. TEETER,
LAWOF MASSCOMMUNICATIONS:
FREEDOM
AND
CONTROL
OF PRINTAND BROADCAST
MEDIA372-75 (4th ed. 1982). Reporters who have
personally witnessed a crime, as had two of the journalists in Branzburg, do not appear
to be eligible to claim a reporter's privilege. Id.
24. In German the term used to describe the reporter's privilege is
Zeugnisoerweigerungsrecht.
25. See, eg., P. CRAMER,DAS ZEUGNISVERWEIGERUNGSRECHT
VON PRESSE UND
RUNDFUNK
(1968); L. HENNEMANN,
PRESSEFRE~HE~T
UND ZEUGNISVERWEIGERUNGSRECHT
(Berliner Abhandlung zum Presserecht Heft 23, 1978); H. HUPPERTZ,ZEUGNISVERWEIGERUNGSRECHT, BESCHLAGNAHMEUND DURCHSUCHUNGSVERBOT
ZUGUNSTEN DES
RUNDFUNKS
IM STRAFPROZESS
(Instituts fiir Rundfunkrecht an der Universitat zu Koln
IM STRAFPROZESS.
EIN RECHTSGUTACHTEN
IM
Band 8, 1971); U KLUG.PRESSESCHUTZ
"SPIEGEL"
-VERFAHREN
(1965); Gross, Zum Zeugnisoerweigerungsrecht der Mitarbeiter
uon Presse und Rundfunk, in FESTSCHRIFT
FUR GERHARD
SCHIEDERMAIR
ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 223 (1976); Gross, Neuregelung des journalistischen Zeugnisoerweigerungsrecht,
1975 NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT
[N.J.W.] 1763; Kaiser, Die Verfassungsmassigkeit des Zeugnisoerweigerungsrechts der Presse, 1968 N.J.W. 1260; Kohlhaas, Das
Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht der Journalisten, in PRESSERECHT
UND PRESSEFREIHEIT:
FESTSCHRIFT
FUR MARTINLOFFLERZUM 75. GEBURTSTAG
143 (1980); Kunert, Das Gesetz
iiber das Zeugnisoerweigerungsrecht der Mitarbeiter oon Presse und Rundfunk, 1975
MONATSSCHRIFT
FUR DEUTSCHES
RECHT885; Loffler, Liicken und Mange1 irn neuen
Zeugnisoerweigerungs- und Beschlagnahmerecht oon Presse und Rundfunk, 1978
N.J.W. 913; Rengier, Die Reichweite des •˜ 53 Abs. 1 Nr. 5 StPO zum Schutze des namentlich preisgegebenen, aber unaufindbaren Informanten, 1979 JURISTENZEITUNG
[J.Z.] 797; Van Gelder, Die Verfassungswidrigkeit des landespresserechtlichen Zeugnisuerweigerungsrechte, 1969 J.Z. 698; Note, Das Neue Zeugnisuerweigerungs- und
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passed by the German Bundestag (parliament). Of the three
countries considered in this comment, West Germany is the only
one that has a federal statutory reporter's privilege.
The origin of the West German reporter's privilege statute
can be traced to statutes enacted in 1868 by three of the German Lander (states).26These first statutes were enacted in response to the Prussian government's failure to pass a similar law
that would have applied to all the German Lander controlled by
Prussia. A federal reporter's privilege statute was not enacted
until 1926, even though the unified German Reichstag had first
considered passing such a federal law in 1874.27By 1965, the
federal reporter's privilege statute stated:
Editors, publishers, distributors, printers and others who have
worked in the production or publication of a periodic publication [are permitted to withhold testimony] about the identity
of an author, source or informant of a publication of punishable contents, when an editor of the publication is punished or
nothing prohibits his p u n i ~ h m e n t . ~ ~

This formulation of the law gave reporters little protection
from compelled disclosure for four reasons. First, there was no
privilege for reporters who were not directly involved in the pro. ~ ~ left many reporters,
duction or publication of a p e r i ~ d i c a lThis
especially free-lance reporters, without protection. Second, even
reporters granted the privilege could not withhold the identity
of their sources unless their editor would be liable under the law
if the material were published. A reporter's sources were protected if an article was false or libelous, but not if the article was
accurate. Consequently, only unreliable informants, whose information is of little value to society, were protected under the
law.30 Third, the privilege did not arise until the information
Beschlagnahmerecht im Presse und Rundfunkbereich, 1978 N.J.W. 1617; Note, Die
Verfassungsmiissigkeit des Zeugnisuerweigerungsrechts der Presse, 1968 N.J.W. 2368.
, ZEUGNISVERWEIGERUNGSRECHT
DER PRESSE
IM STRAFUND DIS26. H.M ~ H LDAS
ZIPLINARVERFAHREN 23-24 (Zeitungs-Verlag und Zeitschriften-Verlag Band 2, 1963).
27. Id. at 25-26, 34. The federal law was not applied to the broadcast media until
1953. Id. at 39-42.
28. Strafprozessordnung [STPO] 1 53(1)(5), 1965 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl] I 1374
(W. Ger.). Because this law was contained in the criminal procedure code it was only
applicable to criminal procedure. Other statutes exist for other types of procedure. Punishment in this context would apparently be for violation of the press laws. See generally
H. MBHL,supra note 26, at 60-74.
supra note 25, at 18.
29. See L. HENNEMANN,
supra note 25, at 19; L. HENNEMANN,
supra note 25, at 16; U.
30. See P. CRAMER,
KLUG,
supra note 25, at 21.
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supplied by the informant was published. Thus, authorities
could compel disclosure before publication, even if the material
was subsequently p ~ b l i s h e d .Fourth,
~~
only the name of the
source could be withheld. Information about the location of the
informant had to be revealed even though such information
might easily lead to the identification of the protected source.32
In response to this weak federal statutory privilege, by 1966
every West German Land had adopted a reporter's privilege
statute. These state statutes appeared to grant journalists a
broader privilege.33 However, the scope of the state statutory
privilege was unclear because of differences between the state
statutes.34 This confusion, combined with decisions by the
Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) and a
vast amount of scholarly work condemning the existing privilege,
eventually persuaded the Bundestag to enact a more inclusive
and comprehensible statute.
The first decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht that encouraged the enactment of a new federal statute was the Spiegel
decision in 1966.35 Spiegel primarily involved the search and
seizure of editorial material from a German magazine, but the
~~
opinion also discussed the federal reporter's p r i ~ i l e g e .The
court stated that the federal reporter's privilege statute was constitutional and partially protected editorial secrecy. However,
since the statute was not comprehensive, the court had to balance editorial secrecy against law enforcement interests, giving
editorial secrecy as much weight as possible until a new federal
statute could be e n a ~ t e d . ~ '
The need for a new federal statute was underscored again in
31. See R. GROSS.GRUNDZUECE
DES DEUTSCHEN PRESSERECHTS
146 (1969). But see P.
PRESSEPREIHEIT
UND STAATSSICHERHEIT
166. See generally L. HENNEMANN,
SCHNEIDER,
supra note 25, at 17.
32. L. HENNEMANN,
supra note 25, at 17.
DIE STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG
UND DAS
33. See, e.g., id. at 25-26; 1 LOWE-ROSENBERC,
GER~CHTSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ:
GROSSKOMMENTAR
•˜ 53 ll 37 (23d ed. 1976); see also Judgment of Aug. 5, 1966, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 20 Bundesverfassungsgericht
[BVerfG] 162, 189.
34. L. HENNEMANN,
supra note 25, at 24.
35. Judgment of Aug. 5, 1966, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 20 BVerfG 162,
189 [hereinafter cited as Spiegel].
36. West Germany has a separate statute according protection against searches and
seizures of media material in criminal procedure. It is codified under STPO 8 97(5). The
federal reporter's privilege in criminal procedure discussed above and mentioned by the
Court is codified at STPO 1 53(1)(5).
37. Spiegel, supra note 35, at 189.
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1973 when the Bundesverfassungsgericht held that the reporter's
privilege statutes of two Lander, Hesse and Hamburg, were unconstitutional in criminal actions.38 The court held that because
the federal government had already enacted legislation in the
area, articles 72 and 74 of the West German Basic Law (constitution) did not give the Lander power to promulgate criminal
procedure laws.39In dicta, the court also stated that a privilege
to withhold testimony did not flow directly from the freedom of
the press clause in the Basic Law.4o
In 1975 the Bundestag enacted a new federal reporter's
privilege statute applicable to criminal proceedings. The statute
states:
Persons, who in their profession participate or have participated in the preparation, production or distribution of a periodic publication or broadcast [are permitted to refuse to testify] about the identity of an author or source of contributions
or documents, as well as about the statements made by them
about their activity, to the extent that it concerns contributions, documents and statements for the editorial portion [of
the publication or b r ~ a d c a s t ] . ~ ~

In a 1978 decision, the Bundesgerichtshof in Strafsachen (the
highest West German federal court for criminal matters) discussed the new statute and noted that it eliminated three of the
limitations found in t h e previous reporter's privilege statute.42

First, no violation of the press laws was required. Second, the
editor did not have to be personally liable under the new law
38. Judgment of Nov. 28, 1973, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 36 BVerfG 193
[hereinafter cited as Hesse]; Judgment of Feb. 13, 1974, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W.
Ger., 36 BVerfG 314 [hereinafter cited as Hamburg].
[GG] arts. 72(1),
39. Hesse, supra note 38, a t 317. Among other rules, GRUNDGESETZ
74(1) (W. Ger.) provide that the states have power to promulgate criminally and judically related laws only if there are no conflicting federal laws. STPO 1 53(1)(5), the federal reporter's privilege statute, was a criminal procedure statute, thus making the state
legislation unconstitutional. See also Spiegel, supra note 35, a t 202.
40. Hamburg, supra note 38, a t 317. This dicta was a response to the theory, proposed by numerous scholars, that a reporter's privilege could be derived from the Basic
Law. See, e.g., P. CRAMER,
supra note 25, a t 36 ff.; R. GROSS,supra note 31, a t 152; U.
KLUG,supra note 25, a t 52-66; H. MBHL,supra note 26, a t 103; Kaiser, supra note 25;
Note, 1968 N.J.W. 2368. Some of the speculation appears to have been fostered by the
language of the Spiegel decision that appeared to indicate the privilege could be derived
directly from the Basic Law. Spiegel, supra note 35, a t 176.
41. STPO 8 53(1)(5), 1975 BGBl I 1973 (W. Ger.).
42. Judgment of Dec. 28, 1978, B~ndes~erichtshof
in Strafsachen, W. Ger., 28
Bundesgerichtshof in Strafsachen [BGHSt] 240, 245-246 (hereinafter cited as
Frankfurt].
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before the privilege attached. And third, identifying information,
as well as the identity of the reporter's source could be withheld.
The court stated that the new statutory privilege was intended
to be "friendly to the press."43 I t is an absolute privilege because
there are no exceptions that relate to the type of crime involved.
However, the statute does not protect journalists who have personally witnessed criminal activity.'* Additionally, after a journalist has revealed some information about the identity of the
informant, the statute no longer provides automatic p r o t e c t i ~ n . ~ ~
Instead, the court must weigh the competing law enforcement
and confidentiality interests to determine if the privilege should
be granted. The privilege will be extended only when (1)the interest in maintaining confidentiality clearly outweighs the interest in criminal justice, and (2) an "extraordinary publicity interest" is involved.46 The court also indicated that, although the
new law approaches the constitutional limits of the reporter's
privilege, the Bundestag's formulation must be respected because of the judicial principle: "When in doubt decide in favor of
the freedom of the press."47
The new "absolute" reporter's privilege is not perfect. The
most prominent problem that remains is identifying persons
who qualify for the privilege. The statute requires a journalist to
participate by profession in the publication or broadcast media
in order to qualify for protection." Commentators have postulated that this wording will continue to deny the privilege to
43. Id. a t 247.
44. Id. a t 247-48, 253.
45. Id. a t 244-45.
46. Id. a t 248-49. This standard appears to give courts discretion, but with emphasis
on the criminal prosecution interest. The court described an extraordinary publicity interest as being when, a t least a t the time of decision, the publication of the article serves
in the general interest to protect especially major rights and when the publication is an
appropriate means to protect those rights. Id. a t 249. This explanation offers little help
in understanding what an extraordinary publicity interest is. However, in the case before
it the court decided that a judicially granted privilege was not appropriate. The case
involved an article based on an interview with a person who was purported to have participated in a mass murder. The article pointed out that the source, still unknown to
authorities, was a "Frankfurt chap". The court held that the statutory privilege had been
waived by this disclosure, and the crime involved weighed against a judicially granted
privilege. The strictness of this holding has been criticized. See, e.g., Rengier, Die
Reichweite des J 53 Abs. 1 Nr. 5 StPO zum Schutze des namentlich preisgegebenen,
aber unaufindbaren Informanten, 1979 J.Z. 797.
47. Frankfurt, supra note 42, a t 248. See generally Judgment of May 10, 1983,
Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 1984 EUROPXISCHE
GRUNDRECHTE
ZEITSCHRIFT
[EuCRZ] 90 (explanation of the extent of a constitutionally based reporter's privilege).
48. The German word used in the statute is berufsmiissig.

440

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I984

part-time and free-lance journalists.4s A second problem is that
only those who work on a periodic publication or broadcast are
granted the privilege. Scholars have contended that the term
. ~ ~ term appears to exclude those
"periodic" is too r e s t r i c t i ~ e The
involved in publishing a book based on research done for a periodical publication, documentary filmmakers, and possibly
others. However, despite its defects, the new reporter's privilege
statute gives West German reporters a solid and broad basis for
protecting confidential sources.

In Switzerland the reporter's privilege has not received the
same amount of attention it has in West Germany. Unlike the
West German Bundestag, the Swiss Bundesversammlung (Federal Assembly) has refused to grant a federal reporter's privilege.
Therefore, much as in the United States, the fate of the privilege has been left to the individual cantons (the Swiss equivalent
of states). Some of the Swiss cantons have enacted reporter's
privilege statutes. However, for purposes of comparison, this section will focus on the canton of Zurich which does not recognize
the reporter's pri~ilege.~'
In 1972, the case of Danuser v. Bezirksanwaltschaft Ziirich" came before the highest federal court in Switzerland. Several juveniles who had escaped from a reformatory were interviewed on television while their whereabouts were unknown to
law enforcement authorities. The show's producer was questioned by the authorities regarding the location of the juveniles,
but he refused to answer.b3Although the canton had not enacted
a statutory reporter's privilege, the producer claimed a privilege
derived directly from the freedom of the press clause of the
49. See, e.g., L.HENNEMANN,
supra note 25, a t 48-50;Liiffler, supra note 25, a t 91314.
50. See, e.g., Loffler, supra note 25, a t 913-14.
51. Zurich is emphasized for two reasons. First, the Zurich canton is dealt with in
the major decision by the highest national court and other informative decisions involving reporter's privilege. Second, the purpose for including the Swiss system in this comment is to compare and contrast how systems with almost identical backgrounds can
reach totally different results. Zurich, one of the cantons to deny reporter's privilege, is a
good tool for comparison and contrast.
52. Judgment of June 28, 1972, Bundesgericht, Switz., 98 Entscheidungen des
Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts, Amtliche Sammlung [BC] I 418 [hereinafter cited as
Danuser].
53. Id. a t 420.
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Swiss con~titution.~'
The court rejected the producer's claim for
a reporter's privilege by relying on section 128 of the Zuricher
Strafprozessordung (Zurich Criminal Procedure Code), which requires full disclosure, with limited exceptions, to investigating
authorities. The court held that the producer had to disclose the
whereabouts of the youths.
A general reporter's privilege cannot be derived from either the
freedom of the press or freedom of expression because the
guaranteed basic rights are not directly affected by the obligation to testify. Whether the journalistic worth of anonymous
informants is of greater importance than the clarification of
particular fact situations so that the anonymity of the informant should be preserved in criminal proceedings, is a question
whose solution cannot be derived from the constitution, but
rather should be handled by the proper legi~lature."~

The court concluded that because neither the Zurich Criminal
Procedure Code nor the federal code contained a reporter's privilege, the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and
freedom of expression were not violated by requiring the producer to answer questions about the youths.56 The court reaffirmed this holding in another case in 1981.b7
The Zuricher Obergericht in Strafkammer (Zurich Superior
Criminal Court) also confronted the reporter's privilege issue in
a case involving the seizure of photocopies of arrest warrants
from a newsroom.b8Although seizure rather than nondisclosure
of the identity of news sources was involved, the court discussed
the reporter's privilege in detail. First, the court reiterated much
of the Danuser decision and pointed out that only doctors, lawyers, and clergy have the privilege not to testify. The court admitted that the confidential relationship between the press and
informants was protected by the freedom of the press clause, but
held that the Swiss Constitution does not provide an unlimited
p r i ~ i l e g e .Freedom
~~
of the press is only a part of the general
freedom of expression that is granted to all citizens and cannot
be used to avoid obligations that are common to all citizens.
54. BUNDESVERFASSUNG
[BVERF]art. 55 (Switz.).
55. Danuser, supra note 52, at 422 (emphasis added).
56. Id.
57. Judgment of July 1, 1981, Bundesgericht, Switz., 1982 EuGRZ 29.
58. Judgment of Sept. 4, 1979, Obergericht in Strafkammer, Zurich, Switz., 76
SCHWEIZERISCHE
JURISTENZEITUNG
317 [hereinafter cited as Zurich].
59. Id. at 320.
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Only the legislature can sanction withholding the identity of
news sources in criminal investigation^.'^ As a result, the court
held that reporters have no greater constitutional protection
from testifying than nonreporters.
The court did acknowledge that the confidentiality between
informant and reporter cannot be totally disregarded. Under
some circumstances the relationship may be considered by the
court, but the anonymity of sources does not require any special
prote~tion.~'
The court stated: "The press in Switzerland survived up until now without a statutory privilege. Despite that, or
perhaps because of that, the press has prevailed in its important
a ~ s i g n m e n t . "The
~ ~ defendant, citing a West German case as aut h ~ r i t yurged
, ~ ~ the court to balance the interest in the collection
of the news against the interest in prosecution in deciding
whether to grant a reporter's privilege. However, even after considering the role of the press the court found that (1)the criminal offense involved in the case was no less important than the
reporter's privilege, and (2) no extraordinary interest in publication was present in the case.64
As this case illustrates, the Swiss have relied on the legislature to decide whether or not to grant a reporter's privilege. The
Swiss constitution does not expressly grant a reporter's privilege
and the courts in the canton of Zurich have been unwilling to
interpret the constitution or criminal code as requiring a privilege. With few cantonal reporter's privileges and no uniform federal reporter's privilege, the reporter's position in Switzerland
remains precarious.
AND COMPARISON
IV. ANALYSIS

The federal reporter's privilege accorded the press in West
Germany is vastly different from that found in the United
States and Switzerland. In West Germany, journalists for periodic publications and broadcasts have an absolute privilege to
protect their sources without regard to the seriousness of the
crime involved. In contrast, in the United States and Switzerland, although some states and cantons have enacted reporter's
60. Id.
61. Id. To emphasize its point, the court stated that a source should not expect his
identity to be protected.
62. Id.
63. The German case referred to is apparently Frankfurt, supra note 42.
64. Zurich, supra note 58, at 320-21.
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privilege statutes, reporters in over half of the states and cantons have no significant privilege to withhold testimony in criminal proceedings. This difference is a result of the unique constitutional and philosophical theories of the three countries.

A. Constitutional Analysis
Journalists in all three countries claim a reporter's privilege
derived directly from a constitutional freedom of the press
clause.s6 The journalists' argument is based on two premises.
First, the press has a constitutionally granted function to inform
the public and stimulate public opinion. Second, a reporter's
privilege is necessary to carry out the press function. Journalists
argue that, without a reporter's privilege, sources are hesitant to
inform and consequently the function of the press is inhibited.
The journalists' first premise has been accepted in all three
c o u n t r i e ~ ?However,
~
the assertion that a reporter's privilege is
necessary in order to perform the press function has been rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Branzburge7and
by the Ziiricher Obergericht in Strafkammer.e8 The West German courts, on the other hand, have been reluctant to reject the
second argument.
Two cases that were discussed earlier illustrate the West
German position. First, in the Hamburg case the Bundesverfassungsgericht specifically denied the constitutional argument
while invalidating a state-level reporter's privilege statute, but
only after weighing the particular facts of the case.69 Second, in
the Frankfurt decision the Bundesgerichtshof in Strafsachen re65. For the claim of journalists' privilege in the United States see, e.g., Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U S . 665 (1972). In West Germany see, e.g., Spiegel, supra note 35; Frankfurt, supra note 42. In Switzerland see, e.g., Danuser, supra note 52; Zurich, supra note
58.
66. For the United States see generally Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19
(1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U S . 532, 539 (1965). For West Germany see generally P.
SCHNEIDER.
PRESSE-UND MEINUNGSFREIHEIT
NACH DEM GRUNDGESETZ
118-29 (1962). For
GRUNDRECHTE
Switzerland see generally P. SALADIN,
IM WANDEL:
DIE RECHTSPRECHUNG
DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN
BUNDESCERICHTS
zu DEN GRUNDRECHTEN
IN EINER SICH ANDERNDEN
UMWELT
43-48 (1970).
67. 408 U S . a t 698-99. Justice Powell's concurrence appears t o give more weight to
the second premise than does Justice White's plurality opinion. The Court's handling of
empirical evidence on the importance of reporter's privilege has also been criticized. See
supra note 12 and accompanying text.
68. Zurich, supra note 58, a t 320. The concept is also implied in Danuser, supra
note 52.
69. Hamburg, supra note 38, a t 317.
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fused to apply the federal statute because the journalist had already revealed some information about his source.70 However,
the court held that under some circumstances a journalist may
refuse further disclosure even when the federal statute is inappli~able.~'This limited privilege is arguably derived from the
constitution.
The reporter's privilege cases in West Germany demonstrate a friendliness toward the press not found in the United
States and Switzerland. This difference cannot be explained by
the history of the constitutional guarantees of free press in the
three countries. The history of the press in all three countries is
filled with struggles against government censorship and control.
As the governments' awareness for the need of an informed public became more acute, and the efforts of the press to eliminate
the shackles of government control correspondingly intensified,
the three countries established constitutional guarantees of a
free press.72 However, the free press provisions of the Swiss and
United States constitutions and the West German Basic Law
have had dissimilar effects on the reporter's privilege.
In Switzerland and the United States the judiciary has interpreted the pertinent constitutional guarantees as requiring
the government to remain neutral in matters dealing with the
press.73 Despite a constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the
press, the press is granted no more rights or privileges than the
average citizen, who is guaranteed freedom of expression. Freedom of the press is only a subpart of freedom of speech and
expression. Therefore, a journalist enjoys no more rights than a
nonj~urnalist.~'
70. Frankfurt, supra note 42; see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
71. Frankfurt, supra note 42; see supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. For
application of this concept see Advertisement, supra note 47.
amend. I; B. VERF.art. 55 (Switz.); GG art. 5 (W. Ger.). The citation
72. US. CONST.
for the West German Basic Law is the new version, but varies little from the older versions. For a brief history of the press, see, e.g., H. NELSON& D. TEETER.LAWOF MASS
AND CONTROL
OF PRINTAND BROADCAST
MEDIA26-56 (4th ed.
COMMUNICATIONS:
FREEDOM
1982); M. L ~ F F L E&R R. RICKER.
HANDBUCH
DES PRESSERECHT
20-28 (1978); C. LUDWIG,
63-81 (1964). One German commentator has noted that
SCHWEIZERISCHE
PRESSERECHT
the government began compelling disclosure of sources and information once censorship
was no longer allowed in order to retain some control over the press. In effect, the granting of freedom of the press caused a need for reporter's privilege. H. M ~ H Lsupra
note
,
26, a t 22-23.
73. Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA.L. REV.731, 761 (1977); see
also Blanchard, The Institutional Press and its First Amendment Privileges, 1978 SUP.
CT. REV.225, 226.
74. Contra Meiklejohn, The Courts, the Press, and the Public: The Case of Myron
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The West German Basic Law contains a provision that
could justify a similar result. The Basic Law states that freedom
of the press can be limited by general laws, i.e., laws that apply
to all persons, and not just the press.'& This provision essentially
gives the legislature constitutional authority to regulate the
press to the same extent that it regulates the rest of society.
Thus, there is constitutional authority for requiring the press to
testify as long as the rest of society is also required to do so?
Although journalists in the United States, West Germany,
and Switzerland are all guaranteed the right to a free press by
the constitution or Basic Law, that right can be regulated to the
same extent the rest of society is regulated. However, in all three
countries legislative power exists to grant special privileges.
West Germany is the only country that has legislatively enacted
a federal statutory privilege. There is nothing notably different
about the West German concept of freedom of the press that
explains this more liberal approach with the exception of a possible government "friendliness" toward the press.

B. The Philosophies of the Three Systems and the Effect of
the ''Performance State" on the Reporter's Privilege
Although freedom of the press exists in all three countries,
the enactment of a federal statutory reporter's privilege in West
Germany may reflect the more encompassing legal theory espoused in that country. Scholars suggest that West Germany has
developed into a "performance state" that not only formally acknowledges basic rights by not allowing government interference
with those rights, but also places an affirmative duty on the
state to implement programs to secure and protect those
rights.77 In essence, the performance state extends the concept
Farber and The New York Times, 30 SYRACUSE
L REV.789 (1979).
75. GG art. 5 1 2 (W. Ger.). For explanation of "general law" see, e.g., R. GROSS,
PRESSERECHT:
EINFUHRUNG
I N G R U N D Z ~UND
G E SCHWERPUNKTE
DES DEUTSCHEN PRESSERECHTS 50-53 (1982); M. L ~ F F L E&
R R. RICKER,HANDBUCH
DES PRESSERECHTS
51-53
(1978).
76. All three countries allow privileges to be granted to some groups, e.g. doctors
and clergy, without requiring that the same privilege be given journalists. All three allow
the press to also receive special treatment from the law, but that special treatment may
not necessarily be derived from the constitutions or Basic Law.
77. See Haberle, Grundrechte im Leistungsstaat, 30 VEROEFFENTLICHUNCEN
DER
VEREIN~GUNG
DER DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTSLEHRER
[VVDSTRL] 43 (1972) (Professor Dr.
Peter Haberle was one of the instigators of the term "performance state"); see also
Benda, New Tendencies in the Development of Fundamental Rights in the Federal Republic of Germany, 11 J . MAR.J. PRAC.& PROC.1 (1977); Kommers, The Jurisprudence

446

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I984

of the welfare state beyond the obligation to distribute welfare
benefits to the poor to include an affirmative duty to the entire
legal system.
One West German scholar has stated that in a performance
state the "performance law" sets the profile of the social constitutional state and, without such a performance law, basic rights
would be socially ineffective."' Merely granting freedom of the
press and formally acknowledging that right offers the journalist
little protection. However, the performance state brings about
the maximal actualization of that right by enacting affirmative
legislation, e.g., a statutory reporter's privilege.
The reporter's privilege in West Germany is an example of a
performance state carrying out its affirmative duty to protect
rights. In contrast, in most areas of the law, the United States
does little more than not interfere with basic rights.79The emergence of a welfare or performance state in the United States or
Switzerland may bring about changes in the reporter's privilege.

West Germany has enacted a national statutory reporter's
privilege that offers extensive protection from compelled disclosure. In the United States and Switzerland some of the states and
cantons have enacted reporter's privilege statutes, but there is
no uniform, nationally applicable law. There are no formal con-

stitutional interpretations that explain this difference. I t may result from the different legal philosophies of the three nations, inparticular the concept of a performance state. Whatever the underlying differences of the three systems, the West German reporter's privilege can serve as a model for a federal reporter's
privilege statute in the United States and Switzerland.

Jeff V. Nelson

of Free Speech in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, 53 S. CAL.L.
REV.657, 673-77 (1980).
78. Haberle, supra note 77, at 47.
79. In the United States, the performance state concept has apparently only been
extended in limited economic situations and some areas of civil rights. See generally A.
AND FUNDAMENTAL
LAW:AMERICA'S
EVOLVING
CONSTITUTION
MILLER.SOCIAL
CHANCE
(Contributions in American Studies No. 41, 1979).

